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Abstract
In this paper we study how international trade in goods and services interact at
the firm level. Using a rich dataset on Belgian firms for the period 1995-2005,
we show that: i) firms are much more likely to source services and goods inputs
from the same origin country rather than from different ones; ii) joint imports are
associated with higher firm productivity; iii) increases in barriers to imports of
goods reduce firm-level imports of services from the same market, and conversely.
We build upon a discrete-choice model of goods and services input sourcing that
can reproduce these facts to guide our econometric strategy. We use our results
to quantify the impact of reductions in goods and services barriers between the
US and the EU. Our findings have important implications for the design of trade
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1 Introduction
Services feature prominently on the trade liberalization agenda. After the recent
Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA), the European Commission stated that “around
half of the overall GDP gains for the EU will come from liberalising trade in services”.1
The recent Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) initiative between the US, the EU and
21 trade partners aims to breathe new life into the Doha Round liberalization talks.
While the future of a trade agreement between the US and EU is highly uncertain in the
current political climate, the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) had services at the heart of its “Market Access” chapter. At the same time a
key element in the ongoing Brexit negotiations for the UK, the second largest services
exporter in the world, is the future of trade in services with both the EU and the rest
of the world.
To date, the economic evaluation of services trade barriers has relied on sector-
specific studies (Francois and Hoekman, 2010), general equilibrium work with separate
goods and services sectors (Francois et al., 2003; Egger et al., 2012) or services-only
gravity models (Anderson et al., 2014). Yet, both anecdotal evidence and recent re-
search show increasingly blurred boundaries between the manufacturing and services
sectors. Production and trade statistics reveal significant services sales, exports and
imports by manufacturing firms.2 This may partly reflect a “servitization” process, i.e.,
a shift from products to solutions and integrated “product-service systems” (Neely,
2008), as well as a greater reliance of manufacturing firms on intermediate services,
both domestic and imported (Nord˚as, 2010; Timmer et al., 2013). These observations
raise the possibility that goods trade may benefit from services trade liberalization, and
vice versa.
In this paper, we study if and how both types of trade interact at the level of in-
dividual firms. In particular, we study how firms’ imports of goods respond to the
liberalization of trade in services, and how firms’ imports of services react to goods
trade liberalization. We believe this question is important for at least two reasons.
First, simultaneous imports of goods and services are a first-order feature of our data,
representing more than 80 per cent of the total value of Belgian imports. Thus, existing
firm-level research focused exclusively on, for example, goods trade completely overlooks
an important services trade component, and vice versa. Secondly, estimating the in-
teractions between the two forms of trade is directly relevant for the design of trade
policy and for ongoing trade negotiations. Indeed, if there are complementarities in
1See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/
2See Crozet and Milet (2017b), Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011), Ariu and Mion (2018), Walter and
Dell’mour (2010) and Kelle and Kleinert (2010) among others.
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sourcing goods and services from the same origin, lowering services barriers might lead
to higher services and goods imports. This also suggests that recent efforts to liberalize
trade in services - where trade barriers are still significant - might be highly effective at
increasing goods trade given that tariff barriers have already fallen to historically low
levels.
To explore the interactions between goods and services trade and trade liberalization
at the firm level, we start by analyzing highly disaggregated data on Belgian firms’
imports between 1995 and 2005. Our descriptive exercise shows three main patterns:
i) firms are disproportionately more likely to import goods and services from the same
rather than from separate origins; ii) firms sourcing goods and services from the same
origin show better performance across a range of productivity measures, both in a cross-
section and in a difference-in-difference analysis; iii) reduced-form regressions suggest
that, even when controlling for firm-year and country unobservables, a reduction in the
goods trade barriers imposed against a country increases the likelihood of observing
positive services imports from that same country, and lower services trade barriers
make goods imports more likely as well.
We build a model of goods and services input sourcing which can reproduce these
stylized facts and offers guidance for our subsequent empirical analysis. The model
features a final sector and two (goods and services) intermediate sectors. Final pro-
ducers may source intermediate goods and services domestically or from abroad. To
capture the observed sparsity of imports across origin countries, intermediate sourcing
is represented as a discrete choice between pairs of country-specific goods and services
varieties. The model fully specifies the probability of sourcing inputs from different
countries and shows that this probability increases in input quality and decreases with
trade costs, all else equal. Conditional on that choice, goods and services import values
are specified as functions of a narrow set of parameters. The model also allows for
technological complementarities between inputs coming from the same origin country.
We then use the model to guide our estimation strategy. We use a two-stage econo-
metric approach where the first stage describes the choice of origin countries and the
second stage describes the value of imports of goods and services from chosen country
pairs. The theoretical model provides us with guidance on how to combine and interpret
parameters as well as on how to deal with selection bias in a consistent and parsimo-
nious way. More specifically, we use the selection model developed in Lee (1983) and
described by Bourguignon et al. (2007). The first-stage selection equation features a
conditional multinomial logit for the probability to source inputs from a given country.
In the second stage, we estimate two export value outcome regressions, one for goods
and one for services, that are augmented with selection-bias controls coming from the
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first stage. We also allow for both firm-specific time-varying and country-specific time-
invariant unobservables that may be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors in both
the first and second stage.
Finally, we use our estimates to perform a quantification exercise. We examine
the impact of three policy experiments consisting in reductions in goods and services
trade barriers between the EU and the US. We find large trade gains stemming from
further integration that, in the current international political climate, might well be
best considered as foregone gains from the lack of further integration. In particular,
we look at the “elimination” of goods tariffs and services trade barriers between the
EU and the US, first separately, then together. In the case of services, we assume
that trade barriers between the US and the EU are lowered to a level corresponding to
countries having bilateral preferential trade agreements including a services component,
as reported by the WTO secretariat. Results reveal substantial gains from liberalizing
trade with the US. A joint good-service liberalization would boost Belgian imports from
the US by 22% for goods and 11% for services. Assuming the same increase for the
whole of the EU would imply an increase in imports of, respectively, 60 and 24 billion
dollars. An important element in our results is that the gains from liberalizing both
goods and services together are higher than the sum of liberalizing goods and services
separately. This demonstrates the presence of strong complementarities between goods
and services trade that have the potential of amplifying the impact of changes in trade
barriers. We believe that this is an observation that deserves more attention in current
trade negotiations.
In addition to the literature on the quantification of services trade barriers mentioned
above, our work contributes to a small number of papers studying the connections
between services and goods trade and production at the level of individual firms. This
literature has been mostly descriptive in nature, highlighting the importance of firms
trading in, or producing, both goods and services (e.g. Lodefalk, 2013; Crozet and Milet,
2017b; Ariu, 2016b). Three recent exceptions are Breinlich et al. (2018), Crozet and
Milet (2017a) and Ariu et al. (2018). Breinlich et al. (2018) analyze the impact of goods
trade liberalization on the shift of UK manufacturing firms into services, but do not
look at trade responses nor at the interaction between goods and services imports.
Crozet and Milet (2017a) study the interaction between goods and services in the
domestic market, finding that service sales have a positive impact on the performance
of manufacturing firms. Their paper complements ours with a domestic perspective
on the relationship between goods and service production but does not investigate
the related policy issues. Ariu et al. (2018) investigate why manufacturing exporters
associate services with goods exports and provide micro-foundations for the different
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mechanisms that can explain the complementarity between goods and services. While
complementing our work on the export as opposed to the import side, they do not look
at trade policy scenarios.3
Our work is also related to recent quantitative models of firm-level imports, such as
Kasahara and Lapham (2013), Armenter and Koren (2013) and Antras et al. (2017).
While these papers also look at import sourcing at the firm level, they do not incorporate
services trade and its interaction with goods trade.
Finally, we follow a growing literature in using the OECD’s Product Market Regu-
lation Index (PMR) to capture the degree of policy restrictiveness in a range of service
sectors. A number of recent papers have demonstrated that restrictions in upstream
service sectors can negatively affect the performance of the downstream manufactur-
ing sectors using those services (see Barone and Cingano (2011); Bourles et al. (2013);
Arnold et al. (2016)). Similar to Crozet et al. (2016) we argue here that the PMR is
also well suited to capturing import barriers and show how it can be used to explain
the sourcing choices of Belgian manufacturing firms.
This paper is organized in five additional sections. Section 2 presents the data and
the stylized facts paving the way for the theoretical model. Section 3 offers a model
of firm-level importing of goods and services intermediate inputs consistent with these
facts. Section 4 introduces our main econometric specification and the correspond-
ing empirical results. In Section 5 we present the quantification exercise. Section 6
concludes.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
In this section we outline the data used in the analysis and provide some descriptive
evidence that will guide the construction of the theoretical framework.
2.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses four types of data: data on trade in services, data on trade
in goods4 as well as service and goods trade barriers.
3There is also a more substantial business literature on the shift of manufacturing firms into services
provision; see for example Roy et al. (2009) and Neely et al. (2011). These papers are descriptive in
nature and do not look at services trade.
4The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) trade data used in this paper is confidential and cannot be
shared with third parties. Researchers willing to access this data should send a request to Catherine
Fuss at the Research Department of the NBB. Please note that in order to replicate the present study
the data can be accessed only at the NBB premises and under the supervision of a member of the
Research Department. All the necessary files to construct the dataset and perform the replication
exercise will be provided upon request.
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Trade Data. Information on goods imports comes from the National Bank of Bel-
gium (NBB). The data is organized at the firm-year-origin-product level and spans the
1995-2005 period. Firms are identified by their VAT number and goods are classified
using the CN 8-digit nomenclature. We consider only transactions giving rise to a
change in ownership and we get rid of transactions referring to movements of stocks,
replacement or repair of goods, processing of goods as well as returns and transactions
without compensation. In this way, we eliminate trade performed by non-resident firms,
accounting for the majority of re-exports. The requirement for observing a firm-level
flow is rather low: firms trading with EU countries had to declare their transactions
in a given year if their cumulative imports in the European Union were above 104,115
Euros the year before. This threshold increased to 250,000 Euros between 1998 and
2005. Firms trading with extra-EU countries had to declare to the NBB any transac-
tion exceeding 1,000 Euros and this limit remained stable over the 1995-2005 period.5
Similar thresholds apply to the French data used in Eaton et al. (2011), Mayer and
Ottaviano (2007) and Mayer et al. (2014).
Data on service imports were collected by the NBB during the period 1995-2005 to
compile the Balance of Payments. In particular, a list of firms had to directly declare to
the NBB any service transaction with a foreign firm above 12,500 Euros (9,000 Euros
from 1995 to 2001). For the other firms, the bank involved in the service transaction was
obliged (under the same threshold requirements) to record the information and send
it to the NBB.6 The data is organized at the firm-year-origin-product level. Firms are
identified by their VAT number and the service product classification follows the usual
Balance of Payments codes counting 39 types of service products.7 We do not consider
transactions classified as “Merchanting” and “Services between Related Enterprises”.
We exclude the first category because it combines the value of merchanting services
and the value of the goods involved. We exclude the second because it doesn’t provide
information on the specific service product traded. The data comprises transactions
under modes one, two and four of trade in services as defined by the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), but there is no information on the specific mode used in
each transaction.8
We match the datasets on trade in goods and services by means of the unique
5For more details on this dataset see Amiti et al. (2014), Ariu (2016b), Bernard et al. (2010) and
Muuˆls and Pisu (2009).
6After 2005 the information on trade in services was collected using different surveys targeting
different types of services and firms. This major change prevents us from extending the analysis to
more recent years. For more details about the change in the collection system we refer to Ariu (2016a).
7See Table 1 in Ariu (2016b) for a complete list.
8The logic of our model can be extended to mode 3 exports with appropriately defined variable
trade costs. However we choose to exclude these transactions from the analysis due to coverage and
quality issues with affiliate sales (FATS) data.
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VAT firm identifier. As will become clear in the following, our estimation procedure is
computationally intensive, forcing us to reduce the dimensionality of our data in three
ways. First, we focus on the top 50 origin countries in terms of total Belgian imports
(goods and services) over the 1995-2005 period. Such countries represent 97.2% of
total Belgian imports over the period of analysis and are listed in Table 2 in the online
appendix.
We further restrict the analysis to those firms that have imported both goods and
services at least once during the period 1995-2005, though not necessarily from the
same country or in the same year. Apart from computational considerations, this last
restriction is applied because our objective is to study interconnections between goods
and services imports at the firm level. In order to construct firm-specific measures of
trade barriers (see below), we also need at least one import flow for both goods and
services. This second restriction means that we cannot make predictions about the
counterfactual behavior of firms outside our sample, such as non-importers turning into
importers. However, we can account for counterfactual scenarios in which, for example,
firms re-start importing services, or start importing from other origin countries. Overall,
firms in our sample accounted for 83.4% (84.4%) of Belgian imports of goods (services)
from the selected 50 countries in 2005.
In order to gain insights into what goods and services are imported jointly, Tables 1
and 2 break down goods and services imports by product category among all importers
(A), the sample used in the estimation (ES) and the sub-sample of firms with joint im-
ports of goods and services from the same origin country and year (Strict Joint imports:
SJ). Sample SJ represents 43.42% (49.43%) of the value of goods (services) imports in
the ES sample. Column 2 of Table 1 reveals that the most common imported products
are Machinery, Vehicles, Mineral Products, and Chemicals. Columns 3 and 4 show
similar product breakdowns in sample ES and (to a lesser extent) SJ, suggesting that
joint goods-services imports affect most product categories. Columns 5 and 6 indicate
that joint sourcing is more likely in some categories though, namely Mineral Products,
Chemicals and Vehicles. Similarly, Table 2 reveals that Transportation, Travel and
Other business services represent the main services imported, but only the latter are
likely to be imported jointly with goods, as are IT, Communication and Construction
services. Overall, the same products tend to be imported jointly in samples ES and SJ
and the joint sourcing phenomenon is not driven by transportation or travel services.
Finally, we drop the product dimension and work with aggregate goods and services
imports at the firm-destination level to make our empirical analysis computationally
feasible. Thus, for each firm-origin country-year combination, we observe total goods
and total services imports. We will, however, use the product dimension in the con-
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Table 1: Breakdown of Belgian goods imports by products.
Section Share of imports Share of imports Share of imports Ratio 1 Ratio 2
(A) (ES) (SJ) (ES/A) (SJ/A)
LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS 2.81% 2.50% 2.02% 0.8927 0.7185
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 3.06% 2.82% 1.81% 0.9225 0.5909
ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND 0.57% 0.62% 0.50% 1.0828 0.8728
PREPARED FOODSTUFFS; BEVERAGES 4.53% 4.29% 3.46% 0.9459 0.7633
MINERAL PRODUCTS 10.83% 12.33% 20.82% 1.1384 1.9214
PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED 10.98% 11.64% 14.65% 1.0599 1.3342
PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; RUBBER 6.05% 5.61% 5.42% 0.9280 0.8958
RAW HIDES AND SKINS 0.43% 0.33% 0.17% 0.7637 0.3857
WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD 1.08% 0.74% 0.54% 0.6847 0.4989
PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS 3.01% 2.82% 2.41% 0.9375 0.7998
TEXTILES AND TEXTILE ARTICLES 4.85% 3.81% 2.65% 0.7853 0.5449
FOOTWEAR 0.62% 0.42% 0.13% 0.6756 0.2062
ARTICLES OF STONE 1.40% 1.18% 0.98% 0.8473 0.7056
NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS 7.16% 8.00% 2.53% 1.1176 0.3542
BASE METALS AND ARTICLES OF BASE METAL 7.46% 7.26% 7.60% 0.9737 1.0184
MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; 18.16% 18.26% 17.09% 1.0056 0.9410
VEHICLES 11.78% 12.83% 14.00% 1.0893 1.1892
OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 1.98% 1.90% 1.46% 0.9571 0.7349
ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.9683 1.0414
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES 2.45% 1.77% 0.83% 0.7226 0.3399
WORKS OF ART 0.74% 0.81% 0.90% 1.0931 1.2065
Note: product shares are computed for the 1995-2005 imports of all Belgian firms (A), firms in our estimation sample (ES) and firms importing goods and
services from the same country in the same year (Strictly Joint imports or SJ).
Table 2: Breakdown of Belgian services imports by product.
Section Share of imports Share of imports Share of imports Ratio 1 Ratio 2
(A) (ES) (SJ) (ES/A) (SJ/A)
Transportation 31.81% 29.69% 22.59% 0.9333 0.7101
Travel 20.56% 21.26% 15.05% 1.0338 0.7317
Communications services 4.03% 4.46% 6.28% 1.1076 1.5592
Construction services 3.08% 3.10% 4.51% 1.0081 1.4669
Insurance services 1.98% 1.41% 0.34% 0.7092 0.1696
Financial services 4.65% 4.65% 4.55% 1.0006 0.9798
Computer and information services 5.29% 5.71% 7.63% 1.0793 1.4407
Royalties and license fees 4.26% 4.64% 7.54% 1.0896 1.7705
Other business services 21.43% 22.09% 28.28% 1.0313 1.3201
Personal, cultural, and recreational services 1.48% 1.43% 1.40% 0.9618 0.9454
Government services, n.i.e. 1.43% 1.56% 1.84% 1.0894 1.2798
Note: product shares are computed for the 1995-2005 imports of all Belgian firms (A), firms in our estimation sample (ES) and firms importing goods and services
from the same country in the same year (Strictly Joint imports or SJ).
struction of our trade barrier measures below. This choice also means that we do not
have to address the issue that the levels of aggregation for goods and services are very
different (39 service types compared to about 10,000 products).
Trade Barriers Data Turning to trade barriers data, we use data on ad valorem
applied goods import tariffs coming from the online customs tariff database (TARIC)
provided by the European Commission. This dataset combines most-favored nation and
preferential tariff-like restrictions applying to goods entering the EU market by country
of origin and CN8 product code for several years. This level of detail is a unique feature
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of these data compared to, for example, the widely used UNCTAD’s TRAINS database
in which only information at the HS6 digit is available.9 The data is organized at the
country of origin-product level and is available for the entire 1995-2005 period. We
denote by tGpgt the ad-valorem (%) tariff on good product p imported from country g at
time t.10
Our measure of services trade restrictions is based on the OECD Product Market
Regulation (PMR) index. More precisely, we use PMR data on the Accounting, Legal,
Architectural, Engineering, Telecom, Post, and Air, Rail and Road Transport sectors,
which we map into our Balance of Payments categories using the correspondence pro-
vided in Table 1 in the online appendix.11 The main advantage of using PMR data is
that they cover service sector restrictions over time and for multiple sectors. Alterna-
tive datasets such as the World Bank SRI or the OECD STRI include more countries
and/or finer service categories coverage, but their coverage only starts after the end of
our sample period and, for the World Bank’s SRI, is only available for a single year
(usually 2008).12
While the OECD PMR mainly captures domestic regulation which is de jure non-
discriminatory (i.e., the restrictions are applied by Belgium to all firms regardless of
the origin country), de facto it represents a potentially serious obstacle to cross-border
trade (Crozet et al., 2016). This is because domestic regulation is usually designed with
domestic suppliers in mind. This makes it harder for foreign service suppliers to serve
the market as they have to comply with the same regulations (which in addition is often
different from the one they face in their home market). Furthermore, the PMR index
has a “barriers to trade and investment” component which directly captures regulations
that are discriminatory against foreign providers. Other papers (e.g. Crozet et al., 2016)
have used the OECD PMR index as a measure of services trade barriers for the same
9See Mion and Zhu (2013) for further details.
10In a relative small amount of cases the information on tariffs is missing. In such cases we record
tariffs as zero and assign a value of one to a dummy that we use alongside the tariffs data to construct
an additional control. More specifically we construct, building on the formula for firm-specific weighted
import barriers for goods described below, a measure of the share of goods imports value of firm k from
country g at time t for which we have no information on the goods trade cost tGpgt. This additional
control is used throughout our estimations.
11Since the data for the Accounting, Legal, Architectural, Engineering sectors are available only for
1998, 2003 and 2008, we impose a linear interpolation for the missing years in order to cover the entire
period of our analysis. For the few Balance of Payments categories for which there is no PMR data we
recode them as zero and assign a value of one to a dummy, that we use alongside the PMR index, to
construct an additional control. More specifically we construct, building on the formula of firm-specific
weighted import barriers for services described below, a measure of the share of service import values
of firm k from country s at time t for which we have no information on the services trade cost tSpst.
This additional control is used throughout our estimations.
12The OECD STRI now has data for several years (2014-2017) but coverage only starts almost ten
years after the end of our sample period in 2005, making it unsuitable for our analysis.
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reasons.
Now, while the PMR index varies across sectors and over time, it does not vary
across the origin countries from which Belgium imports. To allow for variation along
this dimension, we interact the PMR index with data from the WTO Regional Trade
Agreement dataset, which indicates whether a country has a trade agreement cover-
ing trade in services with another country.13 Therefore our measure of services trade
barriers combines the PMR index and the WTO data in the following way:
tSpst = PMRpt ×RTAst
where PMRpt denotes the PMR index for the service product p at time t corre-
sponding to Belgium and RTAst takes a value of one in the absence of an RTA between
Belgium and country s covering trade in services at time t, and zero otherwise. This
interaction between PMRpt and RTAst broadly captures the differential obstacles faced
by a firm exporting service p to Belgium depending on whether the country of the firm
has in place a services trade agreement with Belgium or not. A firm coming from a
country that has no services trade agreement with Belgium is deemed to face higher de
facto or de jure discriminatory restrictions to services trade.14
We acknowledge that there is some debate as to whether RTAs with service com-
ponents actually reduce services trade barriers as opposed to simply reaffirming GATS
commitments that are often less liberal than actual trade regimes (e.g., Borchert et al.
(2014)). However, in practice most of the geographic and time variation in our RTA
dummy is driven by EU membership (also coded as RTAst = 0) whose single market
programme, while still incomplete, is arguably the most successful initiative for reducing
cross-country services trade barriers.15
Equipped with measures of goods and services trade barriers tGpgt and t
S
pst, we are in
a position to construct firm-specific weighted import barriers as follows:
13Available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. These data are based on the
compulsory notification of the establishment of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) to the WTO by
the parties concerned with indication of the content and scope of the agreement. Therefore, we are able
to track the countries involved in the agreement, the date of the agreement and whether it includes
services, goods or both.
14In an additional robustness check reported below, we have also constructed an alternative service
barrier measure by interacting the OECD’s SRI for 2008 with the same trade agreement dummy
variable, tSpst = SRIp × RTAst. Note that the time variation of this alternative measure is entirely
driven by the RTA dummy.
15The EU has also negotiated a range of free trade agreements with non-EU countries that came
into force during or before our sample period. However, most of these were either with small trading
partners (and hence not among the top-50 origin countries we use) or did not contain a services trade
component. The 2000 trade agreement with Mexico is the one important exception here. Overall,
RTAst = 0 for on average 75 per cent of service imports in our estimation sample. Of course, t
S
pst = 0
does not imply that there are no restrictions but simply captures the average barriers for the trade
with members of that group (mostly EU countries).
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where p indicates the good or service product, k the firm, g (s) the origin country of
goods (services), t the year and Impgoodspgkt (Imp
services
pskt ) corresponds to imports of goods
(services).
Constructing firm-specific trade barriers in this way allows us to exploit the product
dimension of our data to some extent, even though we cannot use it for the main analysis
due to computational constraints. Notice also that the weights are time- and origin-
invariant and measure the importance of a given imported good or service for the firm.
The idea behind this approach is to capture the set of trade barriers that are relevant to
firm k, rather than using cruder proxies such as industry affiliation. For example, if firm
k has ever imported good g, this means that g is likely to be of value to firm k (possibly
because it is a production input). So firm k will be affected by higher trade barriers on
good g, irrespective of whether it is currently importing it or not.16 Using time-origin-
invariant weights also reduces concerns with a potentially spurious correlations between
import flows and our trade barrier measures. In our robustness checks below, we will
also experiment with using firm-product weights based on 1995-2000 import patterns
while estimating the model only for the time frame 2001-2005.
The basic combined dataset of import values and import barriers for goods (ser-
vices) at the firm-origin-year level comprises 1,239,294 (1,041,486) observations. Mean,
median and standard deviation of import values (million euros) and import barriers are
provided in Table 3.
Table 3: Some Sample Descriptives
Obs Mean Median St. Dev.
Goods Imports Impgoodsgkt 1,239,294 5.012 0.098 70.214
Services Imports Impservicesskt 1,041,486 1.376 0.080 15.962
Goods Tariffs tGgkt 1,239,294 0.626 0.000 1.966
services trade Barriers tSskt 1,041,486 0.512 0.000 1.038
16An alternative approach would be to use domestic input usage to construct our weights. Unfortu-
nately, such information is not available to us and explains why we need to focus on firms that have
imported goods and services at least once.
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2.2 Key Features of the Data
In this section, we outline three features of the data that will guide the construction of
our theoretical model.
Fact 1: The probability of observing a joint service-good flow is low but substantially
higher than the product of the probabilities of observing them separately.
As documented in numerous studies, firm-level imports are sparsely distributed
across countries and years. In our sample positive goods imports are observed in 11.7%
of all the possible firm-country-year triples and services imports only 5.6% of the time.
Therefore, there is a high number of zeros in the data. While import flows of either type
are sparse, a key feature of the combined data is that imports of goods and services from
the same country are extremely frequent. To see this, consider the count of firm-year
pairs with positive imports of goods from g and services from s. The frequency of joint
imports (g = s) is five times higher than the product of the marginal frequencies for all
countries. This raw statistic suggests the existence of a strong complementarity between
goods and services imports from the same country. Note that such complementarity
cannot be explained by simple comparative advantage and/or trade cost patterns argu-
ments. For example, if the US has a comparative advantage in computers (goods) and
computer services (services), both the probability of joint imports from the US and the
product of the marginal probabilities will be high and should be roughly comparable.17
Fact 2: Importing both goods and services from the same country is associated with
higher productivity.
The higher propensity of purchasing goods and services from the same country
just highlighted could point to complementarities coming from a productivity channel.
For example, the productivity of US computers might be enhanced by the use of US
computer services. This could arise if the US firm selling the computer tailors the
services to the good or even uses the services to make the goods more relationship-
specific, as in the case of maintenance, leasing or “business solutions”.
17For further information, in online Appendix Table 3 we list the products and services that are
most frequently sourced from the same country in our data, and in Table 4 we show the countries from
which joint sourcing occurs most frequently. Interestingly, two service types often associated with
business solutions in the servitization sense discussed above, financial and business services, account
for the majority of occurrences in Table 3. Note that at least for financial services, this dominance is
not present when looking at import shares (see Table 2) although we are of course only looking at a
small share of all transactions in Table 3. The ranking of origin countries by the frequency of sourcing
decisions in Table 4 does not vary noticeably when looking at goods imports, services imports or joint
sourcing. However, the dominance of the top origins increases somewhat in the latter sample.
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To provide descriptive evidence for the relevance of this channel we proceed in
two steps. In the first step, we compare - within the same industry and year - the
productivity of firms that purchase both goods and services from the same country
with the productivity of those firms that purchased goods and services from different
countries. We do so by regressing different measures of productivity on a dummy that
takes the value one if the firm imports both goods and services from the same country
(IGSg=s) as well as on a battery of industry-year dummies. Table 4 shows that firms
importing both goods and services from the same country outperform other firms in all
of the productivity measures we use.18
Table 4: Productivity premia of firms importing goods and services from the same
country
Dep. Var.: ln V A
L
ln Sales
L
OLS TFP LP TFP
IGSg=s 0.2272
a 0.2818a 0.2792a 0.2480a
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 257,529 243,571 253,514 253,514
R-squared 0.1192 0.1795 0.1305 0.1000
Note: ln V A
L
is value added per worker, ln Sales
L
sales per worker, OLS TFP is the
TFP residual of an OLS regression where log value added is regressed on log labor and
capital, and LP TFP is TFP measured using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) routine.
Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
To go beyond this static fact, in the second step we provide evidence on productivity
dynamics of these firms. In particular we compare, by means of a firm fixed-effects
regression, their productivity before and after they start importing both goods and
services from the same country with the productivity of firms that import goods and
services from different countries for the whole period. The results for this difference-in-
difference regression presented in Table 5 reveal that firms that start importing both
goods and services from the same country increase their productivity significantly more
than the other firms sourcing from different markets.
18This difference remains significant when the comparison group is further split into firms that import
goods and services from different destinations and firms that import only goods or services, or when we
restrict the sample to the firms actually used in the estimations for the quantitative exercise - e.g. the
ES sample presented in Table 1. The results are also robust to adding the number of exported products
as a further covariate that is potentially correlated with both firm productivity and the probability to
source goods and services from the same origin. These additional results are available from the authors
on request.
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Therefore, our descriptive evidence suggests that importing both inputs from the
same country is associated with higher productivity. Our model in Section 3 will capture
this feature via a technological complementarity between inputs of the same country.
Section 3 will present our proposed mechanism in depth and discuss how to rule out
alternative explanations of Fact 1, such as savings on country-specific fixed costs.
Table 5: Productivity growth of firms importing goods and services from the same
country
Dep. Var.: ln V A
L
ln Sales
L
OLS TFP LP TFP
IGSg=s 0.0136
a 0.0670a 0.0134a 0.0102c
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Firm and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 257,529 243,571 253,514 253,514
R-squared 0.7198 0.8667 0.7114 0.6230
Note: ln V A
L
is value added per worker, ln Sales
L
sales per worker, OLS TFP is the
TFP residual of an OLS regression where log value added is regressed on log labor and
capital, and LP TFP is TFP measured using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) routine.
Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Fact 3: Controlling for both firm-year and country unobservables, goods trade bar-
riers are negatively correlated with service imports and vice versa.
Our third fact highlights another form of interdependency between goods and ser-
vices sourcing decisions, namely that goods trade barriers reduce the likelihood of im-
porting services from the same country, and the other way around. To show this, we
separately model the choice of importing goods and the choice of importing services
from a given origin country by firm k at time t. For each firm-year pair in the data
for which we observe imports from at least one origin, we construct the dummy IGgkt
taking a value of one if firm k imports goods from country g at time t and zero oth-
erwise (i.e., if the firm imports from two out of fifty possible origins, IGgkt = 1 for two
firm-destination-year observation and zero for the remaining 48). ISgkt = 1 is defined
accordingly.
We model the sourcing decision as depending on both goods and services trade
barriers as well as firm-time fixed effects and country dummies:
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IGgkt = dg + dkt + β
S
1 t
S
gkt + β
G
1 t
G
gkt + η
G
gkt (1)
ISskt = ds + dkt + β
S
2 t
S
skt + β
G
2 t
G
skt + η
S
skt (2)
where, for example, tSgkt is the service import barrier of firm k at time t corresponding
to country g, i.e., the same country for which we consider the goods import barrier
(s=g). Country dummies dg and ds control for gravity determinants of trade flows
while firm-year fixed effects dkt control for unobserved idiosyncratic shocks that may
affect the import decision. We estimate a conditional logit model and cluster standard
errors at the firm-year level.19 Results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Reduced-form estimates of the impact of services trade barriers on goods
sourcing choices, and vice versa
Goods Services
(1) (2)
Dep. Var.: IGgkt = 1 I
S
skt = 1
Goods trade barriers -0.0480a -0.0183a
(0.0026) (0.0029)
services trade barriers -0.0061 -0.0618a
(0.0044) (0.0069)
Firm-Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,209,100 3,123,400
Pseudo R-squared 0.3999 0.3981
Number of firm-years 104,182 62,468
Note: Firm-time clustered standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1
We find that both types of trade barriers have a negative effect on both types of
trade. The probability to import services from a given origin country is negatively
and significantly correlated with both goods and services trade barriers. At the same
time, the probability to import goods is negatively and significantly correlated with
19It would have been perhaps desirable to cluster standard errors at the country level. However, this
is technically not possible when having fixed effects dkt in the regression. Indeed, in order to operate
clustering of standard errors in fixed effects models, individuals (a firm-time pair in our setting) should
be nested within clusters while in our regression the same firm-year could span into several clusters
(countries).
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goods trade barriers. In the same regression the coefficient of services trade barriers is
negative but fails (not by much) to be significant. We check that the correlation between
tGgkt and t
S
skt, which is equal to 0.339, is positive as expected but not large enough to
generate multi-collinearity and prevent identification. As a further check we run the
same regression on a sample that excludes Vehicles from goods and Transportation from
services, as those are likely to capture global value chains trade. We find very similar
results, which we report in Panel a of Table 5 in the online appendix.
Interpreting coefficients in Table 6 is difficult because the conditional logit model
does not allow us to recover meaningful marginal effects. Yet, if we run the same two
estimations with a linear probability model (Panel b, Table 5 in the online appendix),
all coefficients are highly significant and we get the following insights. Considering the
first regression, the expectation of IGgkt in the data, i.e., the probability that I
G
gkt = 1,
is 0.1166. The coefficients of goods and services trade barriers are such that a one
standard deviation increase of such barriers would reduce the probability of importing
goods from a given country by 0.0060 (goods barriers) and 0.0069 (services barriers)
probability units, i.e., roughly 5% and 6% of the unconditional probability. Moving to
the second regression, a one standard deviation increase in barriers would reduce the
probability of importing services from a given country by 0.0007 (goods barriers) and
0.0041 (services barriers) probability units, i.e., roughly 1% and 7% of the unconditional
probability.
3 Theory
In what follows we present a simple sourcing model that will be used to guide our
empirical analysis. The model is simple in many respects and we will subsequently
relax some of its assumptions in order to cope with the richness of the actual data. This
means our framework does not correspond to a structural approach. Yet, the theoretical
model is useful in that it provides guidance on how to combine and interpret parameters
as well as on how to deal with selection bias in a consistent and parsimonious way.
3.1 Households
There are C countries with identical preferences and market structure. To save notation
and match our empirical application we focus on a single importing country and drop
country subscripts in most of the exposition. There are L consumers with inelastic unit
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labor supply. Define the representative consumer’s utility function as:
U(A, {Mp}) = A1−β
P∏
p=1
(Mp)
βp (3)
where A denotes consumption of the freely tradable numeraire good A,
∑
p βp = β,
0 < β < 1 and
Mp =
(∫ Np
0
q
σ−1
σ
pk dk
) σ
σ−1
denotes consumption of a composite final product p (see below) and σ > 1.
National income equals labor income and profits. We assume that each worker
has an equal share in a perfectly diversified international portfolio. Given that our
assumptions about production technology in the numeraire sector imply wages of unity
everywhere (see below), it follows that national income is given by:
Y = L+
L
Lw
Πw (4)
where Πw denotes world profits, which will be determined endogenously below, and Lw
denotes world population.
3.2 Final sector
A sector. Good A is produced out of labor under the following linear technology:
A = F (LA) = LA (5)
where LA denotes labor use by sector A. We assume that A is costlessly tradable and
that all countries produce that good, so that wages equal one everywhere.20
M sector: demand. There are P nontradable final products. For each product
domestic markets are monopolistically competitive. Given (3) demand for variety k of
final good p equals:
qpk = βpY
p−σpk
P 1−σp
(6)
20Sector A may be thought of as agriculture. Having constant wages simplifies the analysis of import
choices considerably. In the empirical part of this paper we will control for cross-country differences
in wages with country fixed effects. Also, the quantification exercise will be restricted to non-drastic
trade policy changes, which makes it easier to abstract from trade-driven wage changes.
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where Pp ≡
(∫ Np
0
p1−σpk dk
) 1
1−σ
and Np is the mass of varieties of product p consumed
in the country.
M sector: supply. As in Bernard et al. (2011) we assume that varieties of each
product p are differentiated by brand and that each firm owns exactly one brand.
Hence, while firms can be active in different product markets, they can only provide one
variety per product.21 Unlike Bernard et al. (2011), however, the number of firms and
production lines is assumed constant throughout the analysis. We make this simplifying
assumption because we are interested in a firm’s input choice problem rather than its
choice of product mix as Bernard et al. (2011).
A production line making variety pk of final good p requires two types of inputs:
goods (G) and services (S). Goods and services are differentiated by origin country,
and each country produces a single variety g and a single variety s (an Armington
assumption).22 We assume that each production line uses only one good g and one
service s23 to produce output qpk using a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas technology:
24
∀p,∀k, qpk(qgpk, qspk) = Θgsξgspkλgλsϕkqαgpkq1−αspk (7)
where qgpk and qspk represent quantities of intermediate good g and service s used
by production line pk and 0 < α < 1. λg > 1 and λs > 1 capture the quality of inputs
g and s. Θgs is a parameter that takes value Θ ≥ 1 if both inputs are sourced from the
same country, and value 1 otherwise.25 ϕk is a firm-specific TFP parameter, while ξgspk
is a random variable whose properties are explained below.
21As a result multiproduct firms have negligible mass on the continuum of varieties, although they
may produce a positive mass of products. This rules out strategic interaction in the pricing decisions of
products of the same firm. As is well-known, relaxing the negligibility assumption makes the analysis
of monopolistic competition substantially more complicated (Thisse and Ushchev, 2016).
22Formally g and s depend on pk, but we choose not to denote them g(pk) and s(pk) to save on
notation.
23In the data we observe firms importing goods and services from multiple countries. Taken together,
our assumptions imply that each good-service import pair is chosen separately on each production line.
This simplifying assumption yields tractable expressions which helps us handle the size of the dataset
used in the estimation (see below for details). We also note that the model is consistent with one
further stylized fact in the data: firms that import from more origin countries also produce more
products (as proxied by the number of exported products). Specifically, a 10% increase in the number
of imported products is associated with a 5.8% increase in the number of exported products.
24The model could easily accommodate the more general case of a CES production function, with
an elasticity of substitution either above or below the benchmark value of one. However, when turning
to estimation some key parameters would not be identified due to non-linearities. Indeed random
utility models, like the one we will spell out below, cannot handle non-linearity in parameters. The
production function could also have labor as an additional factor, though the unit wages assumption
makes the omission innocuous. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
25This assumption, which is motivated by Fact 1, is discussed at length in Section 3.5.
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Our assumptions on demand and supply imply that optimal input choices on any two
production lines pk and p′k′ are independent, even within the same firm. Conditional on
choosing inputs g and s,26 the cost-minimizing input demands of production pk equal:
qgpk =
1
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
(
αps
(1− α)pg
)1−α
qpk (8)
qspk =
1
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
(
(1− α)pg
αps
)α
qpk (9)
so that marginal cost does not depend on scale and equals
cpk =
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
where Γ = α−α(1− α)α−1 is a positive constant.
Given (pg, ps, λg, λs,Θgs, ξgspk, ϕk) and the price index Pp, the producer of line pk
solves
max
{ppk}
{(ppk −
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
)
(
βY
p−σpk
P 1−σp
)
} (10)
which yields the following optimal price
ppk =
σ
σ − 1
Γpαg p
1−α
s
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
(11)
Final production of pk equals
qpk = βpY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1p (12)
so that the profits derived from the production of pk equal
pipk =
1
σ
βpY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ−1
P σ−1p (13)
and corresponding log profits on production line pk are given by
lnpipk = ln
(
1
σ
βpY (
σ − 1
σ
Pp)
σ−1
)
+(σ−1) ln Θgs+(σ−1) ln
(
λgλs
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)
+(σ−1) lnϕk+(σ−1) ln ξgspk
(14)
We now turn to the choice of g and s by each production line.
26Sourcing decisions are analyzed in the next subsection.
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3.3 Intermediate goods and services sector
Choice of supplier We assume that suppliers price at marginal cost, inclusive of
iceberg trade costs.27 We also assume goods and service inputs bear iceberg trade costs
τg ≥ 1 and τs ≥ 1 with τg = 1 (τs = 1) if the good (service) is sourced domestically.
We assume that one unit of intermediate goods (services) is produced out of cg (cs)
units of labor. Marginal cost pricing implies
pg = τgcg (15)
ps = τscs. (16)
Each pair of good g and service s is characterized by a random productivity compo-
nent ln ξgspk which is known and idiosyncratic to production line pk. For each gs pair,
we treat ln ξgspk as a set of iid random variables following a Gumbel distribution with
cumulative distribution function
F (x) = exp
[
− exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)]
]
and density
f(x) ≡ dF (x)
dx
=
1
µ
exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)] exp
[
− exp[−(x
µ
+ γ)]
]
where µ > 0 and γ is the Euler constant. Our assumptions imply that each production
line’s draw of ln ξgspk for a given gs pair is independent of draws for other gs pairs as
well as other lines’ draws. Consistent with this assumption, ln ξgspk is also assumed to
be independent of ϕk.
Within a product line, each purchase of a good-service combination is therefore an
independent choice between the C2 possible pairs of origin countries.28 Given (14), a
production line manager chooses a sourcing country g for goods and s for services to
maximize (a monotonic transformation of):
ln Θgs + ln
(
λgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α
)
+ lnϕk + ln ξgspk.
This can be interpreted as a multinomial logit linear random utility model29 where
27This follows from the Armington assumption and ensures tractability. The setup could be extended
to exogenous country-specific markups, but more sophisticated pricing strategies would prevent us from
finding a closed-form solution for country pairs’ markets shares.
28Note, however, that output and profitability across production lines within the same firm will still
be correlated because of the existence of the firm-specific TFP parameter, ϕk.
29See Anderson et al. (1992) for a textbook treatment.
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pk maximizes utility U˜gspk = ugspk + ln ξgspk with
ugspk = ln Θgs + lnλg + lnλs − α ln(τgcg)− (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk
Given distributional assumptions on ln ξgspk, the probability that production line pk
uses a particular good-service combination gs is given by:
sgspk =
(ϕk)
1
µ ( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
(ϕk)
1
µ
∑
gs
(
( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = ( Θgsλgλs(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
gs
(
( Θgsλgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) ≡ sgs (17)
Notice that the idiosyncratic TFP parameter ϕk cancels out.
Conditional input demand Given (8), (12), (15) and (16), pk’s demand for inter-
mediate good g conditional on choosing gs equals
qgpk =
1
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
(
αps
(1− α)pg
)1−α
βpY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1p
= (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α−1−ασ
(
α
(1− α)
)1−α(
σ − 1
σ
1
Γ
)σ
βp︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bp
Y P σ−1p
(18)
The value of purchased intermediate goods is thus:
pgqgpk = (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) BpY P σ−1p (19)
Similarly, k’s demand for intermediate services s equals:
qspk =
1
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
(
(1− α)pg
αps
)α
βpY
(
σ − 1
σ
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
Γpαg p
1−α
s
)σ
P σ−1p
= (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α)−1 (τgcg)
α(1−σ)
(
α
(1− α)
)−α(
σ − 1
σ
1
Γ
)σ
βp︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′p
Y P σ−1p
(20)
and the value of purchased intermediate services equals:
psqspk = (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) B′pY P
σ−1
p (21)
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Notice in (19) and (21) that an increase in goods iceberg trade costs reduces imports
of services, and vice versa. This holds irrespective of whether the sourcing country is the
same for goods and services (g = s). Also note this result holds in our Cobb-Douglas
specification in which goods and services are neither complements nor substitutes.
3.4 Closing the model
Price Index Recall that
Pp ≡
(∫ Np
0
p1−σpk dk
) 1
1−σ
where ppk =
σ
σ−1
Γcαg τ
α
g c
1−α
s τ
1−α
s
Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk
. From equation 2.25 in Anderson et al. (1992) we know
that the probability of choosing a particular country pair gs, i.e., the probability that
U˜gspk is maximal across country pairs, can be written as:
sgs =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)
∏
qr 6=gs
F (ugspk − uqrpk + x)dx,
where F (.) refers to the Gumbel cumulative distribution function and f(·) its density.
The term inside the integral represents the probability density of ln ξgspk being equal
to x and x being such that gs is chosen. Recalling that all production lines draw from
the same Gumbel distributions irrespective of ϕk we can write:
Pp =
(∑
gs
(
σ
σ − 1
Γcαg τ
α
g c
1−α
s τ
1−α
s
Θgsλgλs
)1−σ
E
[
ϕσ−1k
] ∫ ∞
−∞
ex
σ−1
f(x)
∏
qr 6=gs
F (ugspk − uqrpk + x)dx
) 1
1−σ
(22)
Aggregate Profits and National Income We now index importing countries by
subscript d.
Marginal cost pricing in the intermediate sector implies that only final sector firms
earn profits. Aggregate world profits enter national income as seen in (4). As discussed,
we further assume that the number of firms Nd and each firm’s number of products
{Ndk} are exogenous, in the spirit of Chaney (2008). Note that Ndk ≤ Pd, meaning
that not all firms are active in all products.
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World profits are equal to:
Πw ≡
C∑
d
∫ Nd
0
(
Ndk∑
p
pidpk
)
dk
=
C∑
d
∫ Nd
0
(
Ndk∑
p
βpYd
σ
(
σ
σ − 1cdpk
)1−σ
P σ−1dp
)
dk
=
C∑
d
Pd∑
p
βpYd
σ
P σ−1dp
∫ Ndp
0
p1−σdpk dk
=
C∑
d
Pd∑
p
βpYd
σ
=
βYw
σ
where Yw =
∑
d Yd.
This implies
Yw = Lw + Πw =
σ
σ − βLw
and
Πw =
β
σ − βLw
so that
Yd =
σ
σ − βLd (23)
3.5 The importance of Θgs
The Θgs component in the production function (7) takes a higher value when inputs from
the same country are combined together. We show below that this parameter implies
a greater probability of sourcing goods and services inputs from the same country, a
key feature of the data which we labelled Fact 1 in Section 2. The Θgs assumption also
implies that, everything else equal, import values conditional on importing are higher
when inputs come from the same country. That second implication helps discriminate
between our and an alternative mechanism that may also explain Fact 1, namely fixed
costs savings from jointly importing goods and services from the same country. In
our estimations in Section 4 we allow for both Θgs and fixed costs to affect importing
behavior.
Θgs may capture a number of economic mechanisms. Firstly, it may capture that
there is an advantage if the same exporting firm supplies both g and s.30 This is the
30Ariu et al. (2018) shows that about 10% of Belgian exporters offer both goods and services together,
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case when: i) The good and/or the service are of higher quality if bought from the same
firm. For example, the presence of the service may increase the perceived quality of
the good.31 Relatedly, some intangibles owned by the supplier, such as ISO9000 quality
certification or a reputation for quality, may have non-rival effects on g and s.32 In addi-
tion, proprietary knowledge can give an advantage to original component manufacturers
in tailoring services to their own goods, or using the services to make the goods more
relationship-specific. This is likely in the case of maintenance, leasing or “business solu-
tions” that outsource some of the downstream firm’s tasks. ii) A parent multinational
firm provides specific “headquarter” services along with intra-firm goods trade to an
affiliate. iii) Transaction or search costs are high and/or there are economies of scope in
producing both products. Secondly, Θgs may capture country-specific complementarity
in goods and services, resulting for instance from service providers being more familiar
with national goods. In the case of engineering, design, consulting, maintenance or
monitoring services, that familiarity is likely to make goods and services of the same
origin more complementary than with varieties of other countries. Unfortunately, the
lack of data on exporters in our import dataset prevents us from discriminating be-
tween these stories. For that reason, we refrain from providing more specific micro
foundations.
Interestingly inputs that are jointly sourced tend to be critical inputs for their
importers. To see that, we combine our data with input-output tables for Belgium. We
find that goods and services products that are jointly imported from the same country
in the same year (SJ sample) are systematically characterized by high weights in the
input-output technology of the importing firms. In other words, goods and services
that are key to firms in a particular industry are disproportionately sourced abroad
from the same country.33
Turning back to the model the Θgs assumption implies that the probability of choos-
ing a particular gs combination in our model is generally different from the product of
the marginal probabilities (of sourcing goods from g and services from s). Only in the
special case of Θgs = 1,∀g, s the joint probability equals the product of the marginal
accounting for more than 45% of trade.
31Ariu et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence supporting this particular mechanism.
32According to Bernard et al. (2010) this argument may explain the greater propensity of the most
productive Belgian firms to perform “carry-along trade”.
33More precisely, we assign each firm-year to its corresponding two-digit Nace rev 1.1 main industry
affiliation, and use input-output table weights for Belgium broken down at the two-digit Nace rev 1.1
level for the year 2000. We then compute, separately for the SJ and ES samples, equivalent weights
based on imported goods and services products. We finally analyze the difference between imports-
based weights and input-output weights. We find that products with high input-output weights (key
products for firms in a particular industry) have even higher imports-based weights (disproportionately
sourced abroad from the same country) in the SJ sample.
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probabilities.
To see this, consider the following. Given the finite number of alternative origin
country pairs we readily have:
max
gs
{U˜gspk} = max
g
{max
s
{U˜gspk}} (24)
Consider one possible origin country for goods imports, g∗, that may or may not
be chosen by pk. Due to the IIA property of the multinomial logit, the probability of
sourcing services from country s rather than s∗ is the same conditionally on sourcing
goods from a particular country g∗ or not (see Anderson et al. (1992), p.23, Equation
2.10). Therefore we can start solving problem (24) by choosing a country s among C
possible countries to source services from, so as to maximize:
Uˆ g
∗
sk = u
g∗
spk + ln ξ
g∗
spk
where ug
∗
spk = ln η
g∗ + ln Θg
∗
s + lnλs − (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk (25)
where ηg
∗
=
λg∗
(τg∗cg∗ )α
is an irrelevant constant in this problem, Θg
∗
s =Θgs for g=g
∗ or
equivalently Θg
∗
s = Θg∗s, and ln ξ
g∗
spk = ln ξgspk for g=g
∗ is distributed Gumbel and is iid
across firms and alternatives.
This implies that a multinomial logit model can be used to describe this problem.
The probability of importing services from a country s conditional on g=g∗ is given by:
sg
∗
spk = s
g∗
s =
( Θ
g∗
s λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ∑
s
(
( Θ
g∗
s λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) . (26)
Note that in general sg
∗
s 6= sg
′
s because Θ
g∗
s 6= Θg
′
s . Conversely we can find the
optimal g given s is equal to a particular s∗. More precisely, for a given source country
of services there are equivalent expressions to (25) and (26) leading to:
ss
∗
gpk = s
s∗
g =
(
Θs
∗
g λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ∑
g
(
(
Θs∗g λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ
) . (27)
Finally note the following. Suppose we set Θgs = 1,∀g, s. We will then have sg∗s =
sg
′
s = ss and s
s∗
g = s
s
′
g = sg with:
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sgss =
( λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ∑
g
(
( λg
(τgcg)α
)
1
µ
) ( λs(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
s
(
( λs
(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = ( λgλs(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α ) 1µ∑
gs
(
( λgλs
(τgcg)α(τscs)1−α )
1
µ
) = sgs, (28)
which means that the choice of the sourcing country for goods and services are
independent.
4 Estimation
4.1 Econometric Model
The theoretical model delivers three fundamental equations to be estimated:
max
g,s
{U˜gspk} (29)
where U˜gspk = ugspk + ln ξgspk
ugspk = ln Θgs + lnλg + lnλs − α ln(τgcg)− (1− α) ln(τscs) + lnϕk
pgqgpk = (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) BpY P σ−1p (30)
psqspk = (Θgsξgspkλgλsϕk)
σ−1 (τscs)
(1−σ)(1−α) (τgcg)
α(1−σ) B′pY P
σ−1
p . (31)
where ln ξgspk is iid across production lines and gs pairs and is distributed Gumbel
with shape parameter µ. Equation (29) describes the discrete choice of a gs country pair
by production line pk, which yields the multinomial logit choice probabilities in (17).
Equations (30) and (31) describe the value of a production line’s imports of goods
and services conditional on choosing a particular gs country pair. An appropriate
empirical counterpart to (29-31) will therefore have a conditional multinomial logit
selection equation and two outcome equations. To estimate such a model, we use
a two-stage estimation method drawing on the theory developed in Lee (1983), and
described by Bourguignon et al. (2007).
We extend the theoretical model in four ways in order to bring it to the data. First,
we introduce a time dimension, t. Second, we allow for one-time fixed entry costs to
start importing from a particular gs pair. Once sunk, these costs make the first-stage
choice of origin dependent on past choices, but do not affect second-stage conditional
import equations.34 We use this property as an exclusion restriction. Formally, we
34Because these sunk costs vary freely across country pairs, our assumption is also consistent with
fixed cost savings from joint imports, as in for instance Antras et al. (2017).
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denote by ygspkt a binary variable that takes value one when country pair gs is chosen
by firm k on its production line pk in year t, and include the lagged dependent variable
ygspk,t−2 in the first-stage selection equation, but not in the outcome equations.35
Third, we choose to aggregate imports of goods and services over all products, even
though we observe imports by product category. This helps reduce the dimensionality of
the problem (even with this, our first-stage estimation uses over 250 million observations
and includes a large number of dummy variables). We do however exploit some of the
information coming from the product dimension by allowing trade costs to vary by firm,
country and year: τgkt and τskt. More specifically, we exploit the heterogeneity across
firms in the trade costs of the specific inputs they import as an additional source of
identification and use the proxies outlined in Section 2. In additional results reported
below, we will also decompose the overall impact of trade barriers into their effect on
the number of products or services imported and on the average imports per product
and service.
Finally, we observe sourcing choices by firms rather than production lines in our
data. Some firms only import goods and services from one location each, in which
case firms and production lines coincide. The majority of firms, however, source from
multiple origins and we need to infer production line decisions from the data to make
the estimation consistent with our model. In the first stage, our multinomial logit model
easily accommodates such multi-origin firms because it allows for multiple ‘ones’ within
groups (i.e., firm-years). To be precise, for each firm-year we have (51 ∗ 51)− 1 = 2600
possible pairs of goods and service origin countries.36 Now assume that, for example,
a Belgian firm sources goods from Italy and Germany and services from Germany,
France and the Netherlands in a given year. That firm-year has 3 ∗ 2 = 6 gs pairs:
Italy-Germany, Italy-France, Italy-Netherlands, Germany-Germany, Germany-France
and Germany-Netherlands. Thus, we have six of the 2600 entries equal to one and the
remaining equal to zero in the first stage.
In the second stage, we assign firm imports to country pairs in a way that is con-
sistent with the model’s production-line structure. More precisely, the Cobb-Douglas
assumption implies that each production line uses goods and services in a proportional
way. To continue the previous example, suppose the firm imports three million euros
35In the absence of good direct proxies for sunk costs in our data, using a lagged dependent variable
seems a natural choice. However, we acknowledge that there could be channels through which past
import status directly impacts the level of imports in the second stage, for example through dynamic
learning in seller-buyer relationships.
36Note that Belgium is a possible origin country. If we only observe service imports but no goods
imports for a firm-year, we assume for consistency with our model that the goods input is sourced
domestically (likewise for the case where we only observe goods imports). Given our sample restriction
to importing firms only, the one origin combination that is not observed is Belgium-Belgium, yielding
a total of (51 ∗ 51)− 1 = 2600 origin pairs.
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of goods from Italy, two million euros of goods from Germany and one million euros
of services from each of Germany, France and the Netherlands. The six possible origin
combinations are interpreted as six production lines and we assign the common goods
and services imports to each of the six pairs proportionally: the Italy-Netherlands pair,
for instance, has 1/3 of total goods imports from Italy (1 million euros) and 3/5 of Dutch
services imports (0.6 million euros). More generally, we use the following assignment
rule
∀g = 1, ...G, Impgoodsgspkt ≡
ImpSskt∑
c Imp
S
ckt
ImpGgkt
∀s = 1, ...S, Impservicesgspkt ≡
ImpGgkt∑
c Imp
G
ckt
ImpSskt
where ImpGgkt and Imp
S
skt denote observed goods imports by firm k in year t from country
g and services imports by firm k in year t from country s, respectively. Assigned flows
sum up to observed flows and the ratio of goods to services imports remains constant
across pairs (production lines).37
While this procedure is consistent with our model, we acknowledge that a less re-
strictive model setup not requiring import assignment in the second stage might have
been desirable. However, allowing firms to freely source from multiple goods and ser-
vices origins simply would have been computationally infeasible. As discussed, our
model setup leads to 2600 combinations per firm-year in the data or around 250 million
observations in total. By contrast, if firms can import from nG goods and nS services
origins, we would instead obtain 51ng+ns − 1 potential combinations per firm-year.38
To summarize, we estimate the following empirical counterpart to (29-31):
37In principle, we could have used a similar assignment rule in the first stage as well. That is,
in the above example we could have created six production lines corresponding to firm k with 2600
observations each. For each of these sets of 2600 observations, we would have had only one origin
combination coded equal to one, with the remaining 2599 entries equal to zero. This would have had
the advantage of strengthening the link between the multinomial logit model and the discrete choice
model presented in Section 3. However, it would also have increased the number of observations in
our data by a factor of 12.5 (the average number of production lines in the data) leading to about 3
billion observations in the first stage; something clearly computationally infeasible.
38Note that an approach not apportioning imports in the second stage would require a number of
essentially arbitrary assumptions. To illustrate this, consider the case where a firm imports goods from
one location and services from three origins, including the goods origin. In this case, what services
trade barrier measures should be included in the goods import regression? All three barriers separately,
potentially leading to multicollinearity problems, or some weighted average of the three? Should we
then assign a value of one to Θgs or a value of one third to reflect the fact that part of the input bundle
has been sourced from different origins? In this respect our assignment rule comes straight from the
explicit assumptions laid down in the theory and provides clear guidance for those issues.
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ygskt = 1[U˜gspkt=maxqr{U˜qrpkt}] (32)
U˜gspkt = aygspk,t−2 + θgs +Dg +Ds + a1tGgkt + a2t
S
skt + ekt + egspkt
Impgoodsgspkt = exp
[
b0 + θgs +Dg +Ds + b1t
G
gkt + b2t
S
skt + ukt + ugspkt
]
(33)
Impservicesgspkt = exp
[
c0 + θgs +Dg +Ds + c1t
G
gkt + c2t
S
skt + vkt + vgspkt
]
, (34)
gs = 1...C2 − 1,
where ygskt is a binary variable that takes value one whenever a particular gs combi-
nation is chosen by firm k in year t, i.e., if U˜gspkt = maxqr{U˜qrpkt} and zero otherwise.
Impgoodsgspkt and Imp
services
gspkt are the imports of goods and services from origin pair (pro-
duction line) gs, computed by assigning total firm imports as described above.
θgs is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if g = s and the corresponding
coefficient in the regression is equivalent to ln Θgs in the theoretical model. Dg and Ds
are vectors of dummies for source countries of goods and services respectively while ekt,
ukt and vkt are firm-time unobservables potentially correlated with regressors.
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The trade barrier proxies, tGgkt and t
S
skt, are as defined in Section 2 and represent
the empirical counterparts of (the log of) the firm-destination-time dimension of τgkt
and τskt. Formally, we impose that ln τgkt is a linear combination of a country-specific
component tGg , a firm-time specific component t
G
kt and the trade-barrier proxy t
G
gkt. t
G
g is
a proxy for average trade costs in country g and is absorbed by the Dg country dummy.
tGkt controls for the average trade costs for the particular bundle of goods purchased by
firm k and goes into firm-time unobservables. tGgkt corresponds to the import tariff of
the firm-specific bundle in country g in year t. We impose a similar linear form for
ln τskt.
Turning to the cost of producing intermediate goods cg, our empirical specifications
allow this to be firm-origin-time-specific: cgkt. We impose that (the log of) cgkt can
be linearly decomposed into a country-specific component that will be absorbed by the
Dg country dummy, and a firm-time specific component that we capture by means our
firm-time unobservables. We impose a similar linear form for cskt. We also assume that
egspkt is distributed Gumbel. We finally allow the value of imports of goods and services
to be measured with error, under the assumption that such measurement error is iid.
39We refrain from using country-time dummies for reasons related to computational power. Even
with a dedicated multi-core server, running the first stage (32) with country-time dummies implies
estimating a non-linear model with more than 1000 dummy variables that are not possible to partial
out over a sample of about 250 million observations. However, we can run the two second stages (33)
and (34) with country-time dummies. The results, provided in Table 9 below, are very similar to those
obtained with country dummies.
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Therefore ugspkt and vgspkt contain such measurement error and are in general different
from egspkt. In terms of inference, we cluster standard errors at the firm-time level in
all estimations.40
Five things are worth noting. First, the firm-time specific component ekt in (32) can
be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors but vanishes when estimating the first stage
conditional logit model. Indeed, components that are not choice-specific do not affect
estimations of choice-specific coefficients and/or the choice probabilities. Second, firm-
time specific components ukt and vkt in (33) and (34) can also be arbitrarily correlated
with the regressors and will be accounted for by means of fixed effects. Both types of
firm-time components will capture variation over time and unobserved heterogeneity in
input prices as well as downstream firms’ TFP not accounted for by the model. Third,
although the assumptions in Lee (1983) are in general restrictive, they are coherent
with our framework. As discussed in Bourguignon et al. (2007), Lee (1983) imposes a
certain structure on the correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome
equations. Considering for example the import of goods outcome, the correlations
between eqrpkt - egspkt and ugspkt should be identical for all q and r. This result naturally
follows in our framework from the fact that egspkt and ugspkt are iid across alternatives
and differ from each other only by some orthogonal iid measurement error. Fourth,
because of the presence of ygspk,t−2 and the fact that we allow trade barriers to be firm-
time-origin specific, the probability of choosing a particular gs sourcing pair at time t
will vary across production lines and time (sgspkt = sgs in the model in Section 3). Yet,
it is straightforward to show it is still true that sgspkt will in general be different from
the product of marginal probabilities sgpkt and sspkt and will be equal to that product
only in the special case of θgs = 1,∀g, s.41 Fifth, in the second stage of the model we
estimate equations (33) and (34) by means of a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood
(PPML) estimator rather than log-linearizing and using OLS. This reflects our interest
in import values, rather than log-values, which is instrumental to our quantification
exercise.42
40It would have been perhaps desirable to cluster standard errors at the country level. However,
this is technically not possible when having fixed effects in a regression. Indeed, in order to operate
clustering of standard errors in fixed effects models individuals (a firm-time pair in our setting) should
be nested within clusters while in our estimations the same firm-year could span into several clusters
(countries).
41In estimating (32) we employ the Stata command clogit and trim some observations based on
the distribution of the number of instances ygspkt is equal to one across firm-years. More specifically,
we exclude from the estimation those (very few) observations pertaining to firms that in a given
year import from more than 100 goods-services origin pairs. We do this because of computational
constraints.
42The equivalence between a Poisson and a log linear model strictly holds in the case of errors
distributed log-normally and homoscedasticity. In such a case Lee (1983) is perfectly consistent with
our framework and in particular with estimating second stages in levels rather than log-linearizing.
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4.2 Estimation Results
Focusing on column (1) of Table 7, we can observe the first step of our estimation
procedure for the complete sample. The exclusion restriction, ygspk,t−2, is highly sig-
nificant, meaning that past import status/fixed costs is a strong predictor of current
import status. All the other covariates have the expected sign and significance level.
More specifically, goods and services are disproportionately more likely to be sourced
from the same country (positive and significant coefficient of θgs) while trade barriers
for both goods and services matter in the choice of a particular gs pair.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 7, we show the results of the second step of our
estimation. The most important result is that there is again evidence of strong com-
plementarities in importing goods and services together, as shown by the positive and
significant coefficient of θgs. In particular, firms import a higher value of goods and
services when sourcing from the same country which is at odds with a simple fixed
costs savings mechanism. At the same time, goods (services) trade barriers decrease
goods (services) import values. Moreover, services trade barriers have a negative and
significant effect on the value of goods imports. Similarly, goods trade restrictions have
a negative and significant impact on services imports values. Finally, the additional
control for selection dictated by the Lee (1983) model and coming from the first step
(we loosely label this ‘inverse Mills ratio’ - IMR - in what follows) is highly significant
in both the goods and services values regressions suggesting that it is indeed warranted
to control for selection.
In terms of magnitudes there are several things to notice. First, the easiest coefficient
to interpret and compare with previous studies is the one of tGgkt in column (2). That
coefficient measures the elasticity of goods trade values with respect to tariffs. A value
of -2.44% means that a 1% ad valorem tariff reduces trade values by 2.44%; a number
in line with the existing literature on trade elasticities (Broda and Weinstein, 2006).
As far as θgs is concerned, values from columns (2) and (3) indicate that, everything
else equal, importing goods and services from the same country corresponds to about
45-50% higher import values. This is by all means sizeable. Moving to tSskt, there is
no clear scale to consider but variation in the data. In this respect, a one standard
deviation increase in tSskt implies a 13% decrease of import values for goods and a 5%
decrease of import values for services. The corresponding numbers for tGgkt are a 5%
reduction for goods and a 6% reduction for services. All in all, this suggests there is
scope for larger trade boost effects stemming from a reduction in services as compared
to goods trade barriers.
Finally, in estimating (33) and (34) we trim the top and bottom 0.5% of observations based on the
distribution of Impgoodsgspkt and Imp
services
gspkt .
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Second, in the model described in Section 3 the parameters corresponding to θgs, t
G
gkt
and tSskt are the same across the selection and outcome equations. The use of a latent
model for estimating the selection equation means that the coefficients of our first
stage are not comparable to those of the second stage. More specifically, coefficients in
column one cannot be translated into meaningful partial effects within the conditional
multinomial logit model.43 Yet, coefficient ratios are comparable. In this respect,
looking across coefficients in columns (1) to (3) does suggest that, despite being simple,
our model imposes coefficient restrictions that find some counterpart in the data.
In Panel (b) an (c) of Table 7 we decompose the effect on total imports into two
margins of adjustment: the number of products or services and the average imports per
product or service. In panel (b) we present the results for the imports of goods and
in panel (c) those for the imports of services. As is evident from these results, service
and goods trade barriers have an effect on both adjustment margins for both goods and
services trade. That is, higher tariffs on goods not only reduce the number of products
imported and the average imports per product but have a similar effect on the number
of service types and the average imports per service. Likewise, services trade barriers
reduce both goods and services trade along both adjustment margins.
To explore the data further and provide additional support to our analysis, in panel
(a) of Table 8 we restrict our estimations to the sample of firms belonging to the
manufacturing sector only. The idea is to check whether results are possibly stronger for
such firms who are more likely to combine imported goods and services into a production
process along the lines described in equation (7). Results look qualitatively identical to
those of the complete sample both for the first step and for the second steps. In terms
of magnitudes, however, the coefficients corresponding to trade barriers in the outcomes
equations (first step coefficients are not really comparable) are considerably larger when
restricting the attention to manufacturing firms which is in line with intuition. On the
other hand, the coefficients of θgs are broadly similar between Table 7 and Table 8
suggesting that the strength of complementarities between goods and service sourced
from the same country is roughly comparable for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
firms.
In panel (b) of Table 8 we restrict our estimation sample to Belgian multinational
and foreign owned firms.44 On the one hand, these firms have a more prominent in-
volvement in international activities than purely domestic firms and might be the ones
benefiting the most from a reduction in trade barriers. On the other hand, they also
have extended networks across countries allowing them to minimize the impact of dif-
43See Wooldridge (2010) for an in-depth discussion of this point.
44It is possible to identify such firms using the NBB Survey on FDI.
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ferences in trade costs across origins. Despite the sharp reduction in the number of
observations, results in columns (4) to (6) look very similar to those of the complete
sample and coefficients are all significant apart from a single case. Magnitudes are also
roughly comparable between the complete sample and the multinational and foreign
owned sample suggesting that multinational and foreign owned firms are no more or
less likely to benefit from a trade liberalization in goods and/or services.45
In panel (c) we analyze to what extent potential endogeneity arising from the use of
in-sample weights for our trade barrier measures could be affecting our results. Specif-
ically, we now compute firm-level weights using data for the period 1995-2000 and
perform the regression for the 2001-2005 period only. Using pre-sample weights in this
way should reduce endogeneity concerns although it also more than halves sample size.
As seen, the results are very similar to our baseline regression in Table 7. Significance
levels are reduced for two of the services trade barrier coefficients but this seems to be
mainly due to the strong decrease in the number of observations (coefficient magnitudes
are not systematically smaller in absolute terms).
Table 9 reports the results of three additional robustness checks. For comparison,
Panel (a) reproduces the estimates from our baseline specification (panel (a) of Table 7).
In Panel (b) we run another alternative set of second-stage regressions where we control
for country-year fixed effects. (As explained above, using country-year in addition to
firm-year fixed effects in the first stage would be computationally infeasible.) In these
regressions, we use the inverse Mills ratio from the baseline regression to control for
selection effects. Results are qualitatively similar to the baseline, with slightly higher
estimated trade cost elasticities.
In panel (c) we check whether controlling for selection is crucial for our results. In
particular, we exclude from the estimation of the two outcome equations the inverse
Mills ratio computed in the (baseline) first stage. Results remain qualitatively un-
changed. However, coefficient values are increased somewhat in absolute terms. Over-
all, this suggests that controlling for selection is warranted but does not affect our core
findings much.
Finally, in panel (d) we use the services trade Restriction Index data developed by
the World Bank as an alternative measure of services trade restrictiveness. Results
again remain substantially unchanged.46
45Insofar as multinational firms are more likely to trade within firm boundaries, these results are also
suggestive of intra-firm trade patterns of goods and services imports being similar to at-arm’s-length
trade. Unfortunately, our data is not detailed enough to allow a more direct investigation. This is
because the services trade data lump all intra-firm transactions into one aggregate category called
“Services between Related Enterprises”, and our goods trade data also do not allow us to identify
intra-firm transaction separately.
46In unreported results, we have also run regressions with origin-pair firm fixed effects in the first
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5 Quantification
Our empirical model can be used to quantify the impact of changes in trade barriers
on both trade in goods and trade in services. In this respect we acknowledge that, due
to the above discussed discrepancies between the empirical model laid down in Section
4 and the discrete choice sourcing model presented in Section 3, the results presented
below do not correspond to a fully structural counterfactual analysis.
We focus on data referring to the most recent year – 2005 – and hypothesize that
the EU and the US sign a trade agreement. We explore the effects of three different
scenarios: i) the trade agreement eliminates barriers to trade in goods only (Scenario
G); ii) the trade agreement eliminates barriers to trade in services only (scenario S); iii)
the trade agreement eliminates barriers to both goods and services (Scenario GS). More
precisely, we consider counterfactual scenarios where the US and the EU set zero tariffs
on goods (G), implement provisions on trade in services that replicate the services trade
agreements in our data, which we used to quantify our parameters (S), or do both (GS).
Our thought experiment thus provides insights into the potential effects of a trade
agreement between the United States and the European Union.47 Our exercise involves
the comparison of imports of Belgian firms predicted by our model under the current
trade barriers situation versus the situation in which trade barriers between Belgium
and the US are set to zero (tGgkt = 0 when g = US and/or t
S
skt = 0 when s = US).
This is accomplished in three steps: first we compute for all firms the counterfactual
probabilities of importing goods and services from any gs pair under the different sce-
narios, as described in equation (32); second, we compute counterfactual firm imports
from any gs pair using equations (33) and (34). Finally, we consider the product of
importing probabilities and imported values at the firm level and aggregate this up to
obtain total trade values.
This process is computationally intensive due to the dimensionality of the data
but otherwise straightforward. More involved calculations are required to compute
counterfactual changes in the product-line price indices (22).48 Counterfactual price
stage and origin-country-firm fixed effects in the second stage, so that identification relied on time-
series variation only. Results were qualitatively similar to our main specification and the coefficients
on the tariff variables were if anything larger in magnitude than before. However, given that there is
not much variation within firm-origin pair groups, the effective sample size was dramatically reduced
(to about 1 per cent of the original first-stage sample).
47We fully acknowledge that the TTIP proposal involved more than just goods and services trade.
For example, issues related to investments or intellectual property rights were supposed to be covered
by the agreement. Our experiment should be seen as only quantifying the consequences of this type
of agreement for trade in goods and trade in services, all else equal. Given the current state of
international trade relations, the reader might also want to interpret our results as trade increases
foregone because of the lack of further integration.
48Rather than solving the integral involved in (22) we use estimates from the first stage and draw
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index values are needed to correctly scale firm imports from any gs pair coming from
(33) and (34) but do not affect first stage probabilities. We find such counterfactual price
index changes to be rather small (around -0.1% for all three liberalization scenarios)
and so in what follows we ignore them.
Comparing the predicted baseline probabilities of importing and those predicted
under the three different scenarios for the US, we observe in Table 10 that the share
of importers of services increases by 0.3% in case of trade in goods liberalization (G),
by 4.2% in the case of services liberalization (S) and by 4.5% in case of both goods
and services liberalization (GS). The increases in the share of firms importing goods
from the US are respectively 6.0% (G), 0.1% (S) and 6.1% (GS). Therefore, both trade
liberalizations have positive effects on both the share of Belgian goods and services
importers from the US.
Table 10: Results of the counterfactual experiments
Scenario Changes:
Share of G importers Share of S importers Aggregate G imports Aggregate S imports
Baseline
G +6.0% +0.3% +16.5% +2.3%
S +0.1% +4.2% +4.8% +8.0%
GS +6.1% +4.5% +21.9% +10.6%
Set θgs = 1,∀gs
G +16.8% +0.8%
S +1.7% +7.5%
GS +18.7% +8.5%
We now turn to the effects on overall import values. Our model does a good job in
matching aggregate imports by country. More specifically, our model can replicate 95%
of the cross-country variation in goods imports and 87% of the cross-country variation
in trade in services. Looking at our three scenarios, we see from Table 10, that goods
imports from the US would increase by 16.5% for the goods-only liberalization (G),
by about 4.8% for the services trade liberalization (S) and by 21.9% in the case of
both (GS). Considering that in 2015 the US exported goods to Belgium for a value
of about 34 billion dollars, a 21.9% increase stemming from a joint goods and services
liberalization translates into approximately 7.5 billion dollars more trade. Using similar
figures for the entire EU the 21.9% figure would imply a 60 billion dollars increase in
trade in goods between the US and the EU. Using a similar reasoning a services-only
a 254,204,600 iid random sample from the Gumbel distribution. Using both the parameters and the
254,204,600 ln ξgspkt values we then compute the numerical equivalent of (22) while setting σ = 5 as
suggested in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). We repeat the process 200 times and assign to P the
average value across the 200 replications. This corresponds to the initial value of the price index. In
order to compute counterfactual changes of the price index we apply the same procedure while using
counterfactual parameter values.
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(goods-only) trade liberalization would only bring about 14 (45) billion dollars more
trade in goods between the US and the EU. Therefore, the increase in goods imports
would be important for both liberalizations, but the highest gains can be achieved only
through joint liberalization. Moreover, the effect of joint liberalization is somewhat
stronger than the separate effects of the two (i.e. the gains from (G) + (S) are lower
than (GS)).
Looking at the services imports side in the last column of Table 10, the increases
would respectively be of 2.3% (G), 8.0% (S) and 10.6% (GS). Considering that in 2014
the US exported services to the EU for a value of about 220 billion dollars, an 11%
increase translates into 24 billion dollars more trade. As for goods, both liberalizations
affect trade in services, but the joint effect of (GS) is slightly stronger than the sum
of the two (G+S). Our numbers are qualitatively similar to those computed for other
European countries and with different methodologies. For example, Felbermayr and
Larch (2013) study the potential impact of TTIP on some EU countries’ imports and
exports. Their study predicts an increase in US exports to Germany in the order of
18% for goods and 1.4% for services.49
In our analysis we model complementarities between imports of goods and services
at the firm level via two channels: (i) a technological parameter Θgs taking a value
greater than unity when goods and services are imported from the same country; (ii)
the joint use of goods and services in firms’ production functions implying that service
(goods) trade barriers impact the sourcing choice and value of goods (services) imports.
In order to gauge which effect dominates quantitatively in our analysis we perform the
following exercise. We first eliminate the effects arising from Θgs. In terms of our
econometric specification, this is done by setting the dummy variable θgs in equations
(32)-(34) to zero for all g and s. We then recompute import probabilities, import
values and aggregate imports by country. Finally, we perform our 3 counterfactual
trade liberalization scenarios under the θgs = 0 constraint. In doing so we find the
increase in trade in goods with the US to be 16.8% (G), 1.7% (S) and 18.7% (GS).
With respect to services imports, we predict increases of 0.8% (G), 7.5% (S) and 8.5%
(GS). These numbers are overall smaller than with an unconstrained θ, but suggest
that channel (ii) is relatively more important.
Lastly, we note that our model also features third-country effects. Trade barriers
with the US affect Belgian firms’ importing probabilities, import values and therefore to-
tal imports from all countries. As shown in online appendix Table 6, however, aggregate
49Their liberalisation scenario for goods trade is identical to ours (elimination of tariff barriers but
no reductions of non-tariff barriers) while the assumed services trade liberalisation scenario is less far-
reaching and not directly comparable to ours (see p.58 in their paper for details). This might explain
the smaller estimated effect on services trade in their study.
39
country-level import changes are quantitatively small, mostly below 1%. Qualitatively,
the changes follow clear patterns. Consider first a reduction in goods trade barriers
only. It has a negative impact on Belgian imports of from third countries, because
the now cheaper US goods are substitutes with respect to goods imported from other
countries. However, our Cobb-Douglas production function (7) implies that services
imports from third countries are positively affected, because the now cheaper US goods
are complements of services imports from all countries (more so of US services imports
services, due to the parameter Θ). When we consider a reduction in services trade
barriers with the US only, mirror-image patterns apply. Now consider a joint reduction
of goods and services trade barriers with the US. We find that complementary effects
dominate substitution effects: trade in both goods and services with third countries
increase in all but a few instances (trade in goods with Liberia, Slovakia and Turkey as
well as trade in services with Taiwan). In terms of most affected countries, substitution
effects tend to be stronger for some of the major EU partners of Belgium (France, UK,
Poland) as well as for Turkey, Israel and Brazil. As for complementarity effects, a much
stronger geographical pattern emerges in which EU partners enjoy the largest increases
in trade (especially Luxembourg, Italy, Germany and Spain).50
6 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the interactions between goods and services imports within
firms and explore the implications for goods and services trade policies. We start from
several observations pointing towards some complementarity between imports of both
types of products. Firstly, sourcing both goods and services from the same country is
disproportionately likely, given the marginal frequencies of importing goods or import-
ing services from that country. Secondly, importers of both goods and services account
for the lion’s share of Belgian imports and joint sourcing is associated with higher pro-
ductivity. Thirdly, services imports appear to be negatively correlated with goods trade
barriers and vice versa, even when controlling for firm-year and country unobservables.
We then develop a theoretical model to guide our empirical analysis that embeds
a discrete choice of input origin countries in a simple general equilibrium setup. The
model ties the choice of origin countries and the conditional choice of import values to a
relatively narrow set of parameters. In particular, we capture technological complemen-
50In our theoretical framework, the counterfactual changes in trade barriers affect Belgian and other
non-US suppliers in the same way. In the data, however, we do not have information on domestic input
sourcing and hence cannot observe a large part of the demand for domestic inputs (that by Belgian
firms from other Belgian firms). As a consequence, we exclude Belgium from our third-country effects
in online appendix Table 6.
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tarities in goods and services from the same origin country. Moreover, goods-services
linkages in our model create a trade policy spillover, not just from intermediate to final
products, but also from intermediate goods to intermediate services.
In moving to the empirics, we go beyond the model to better capture the richness of
the data and to consider complementary channels. In particular, we use the selection
model developed in Lee (1983) and described by Bourguignon et al. (2007). The first-
stage selection equation features a conditional multinomial logit for the probability
to source inputs from a given country. In the second stage, we estimate two export
value outcome regressions, one for goods and one for services, that are augmented with
selection-bias controls coming from the first stage. We also allow for both firm-specific
time-varying and country-specific time invariant unobservables that may be arbitrarily
correlated with the regressors in both the first and second stage.
Our estimation allows us to compute counterfactual responses to changes in trade
barriers and to quantify goods-services spillovers. Our results are important not just
because bi-traders account for a large share of trade, but also because they can affect
the design of trade policy evaluation and of trade policy itself.
By focusing on firms rather than sectors, this paper offers a first attempt at looking
at goods-services trade policy spillovers while accounting for the ongoing “servitization”
of manufacturing. Several simplifying assumptions were necessary to achieve tractabil-
ity and we look forward to further work extending our approach.
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